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KF-21 Boramae and Turkey’s KAAN: What Is Confirmed, and Where Indonesia Actually Sits

As of 4 Oct 2026 the KF-21 has a delivered production jet and F414s on order; KAAN has two short 2024 flights and an F110 license. Indonesia cut its KF-21 share and signed for 48 KAANs. No sourced Korea–Turkey technology transfer.

A Axortex · Oct 4, 2026

TL;DR — As of 4 Oct 2026, South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae is a flying, production aircraft: the first serial jet was handed to the Air Force on 22 Sep 2026, after a 19 Jul 2022 first flight and a development program DAPA priced in the 8 trillion-won range. Turkey’s KAAN has a real first flight too — 21 Feb 2024, 13 minutes, 8,000 feet, 230 knots, per TUSAŞ and Anadolu — but the jets now called P1 and P2 had not been reported in the air by 2 Oct 2026. Both programs still fly on US engines: Hanwha is building about 40 GE F414s for the first 20 KF-21s; KAAN’s prototypes use GE F110s, with a US export license for 80 more that Turkish Aerospace’s CEO said cleared Congress on 9 Jul 2026. The documented link between the two jets is Indonesia, not a Korea–Turkey technology handoff. Jakarta cut its KF-21 share to 600 billion won and, on 26 Jul 2025, signed for 48 KAANs with no price or delivery date in the defence-ministry statement. This article found no primary report that Seoul transferred KF-21 technology to KAAN.

Last checked: 4 Oct 2026 (KST). Axortex comparison for readers outside Korea and Turkey. Figures below are attributed to the outlet and the date. Where two official-sounding numbers conflict, both are kept.

Why these two jets get paired

They are the two fighter programs most often offered as proof that a US ally can build a supersonic combat aircraft without buying the finished jet from Lockheed Martin or Boeing. Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) called the KF-21 a 4.5-generation fighter at first flight. Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ / TAI) call KAAN a fifth-generation aircraft, and Reuters quoted Turkey’s defence ministry using that label when Indonesia signed. Those are program claims, not a shared definition. The flight-test record underneath them is not the same, and neither jet is free of a US engine license.

They are also paired because Indonesia tried to stand in both lines. That is a sourcing story, not a rumor that Seoul and Ankara swapped blueprints. A search of DAPA, Yonhap, Reuters, Anadolu, SSB and TUSAŞ reporting for this piece did not turn up a named official saying Korea transferred KF-21 design data, radar technology or engine know-how to the KAAN program. Claims that such a transfer happened are omitted here.

What is actually in the air

KF-21

DAPA signed the engineering and manufacturing development contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in December 2015, after Washington in April 2015 refused to release four items Seoul had asked for: an AESA radar, an infrared search-and-track system, an electro-optical targeting pod, and an RF jammer. Yonhap reported that history on the day of first flight, and reported that Hanwha Systems and LIG Nex1 then developed those items in Korea. That is the sourced origin of the “homegrown” claim. It is not a claim that every box on the jet is Korean. The engine is not.

The first prototype flew at the Air Force’s 3rd Flying Training Wing in Sacheon on 19 Jul 2022, taking off at 3:40 p.m. and landing at 4:13 p.m., DAPA told Yonhap. KAI’s public program page lists that first flight as 07.19 and a ceremony on 09.28. Yonhap said five prototypes were out by the July flight, with a sixth due that month; by the June 2024 production contract, Yonhap described a fleet of six prototypes.

The Korea Herald, citing the Air Force and DAPA, reported on 22 Sep 2026 that the test campaign had covered about 1,600 flights and some 13,000 test conditions, including aerial refueling and air-to-air weapons tests; that the jet received combat-suitability certification in May 2026; and that system development was completed in June 2026. KAI’s own page lists weapons-separation events and a “provisional” combat-suitability date as bare calendar days, without years on the bullets this page returned. Those undated bullets are not used here as a second timeline.

The first mass-produced aircraft, tail No. 001, was accepted on 22 Sep 2026 by Maj. Han Jae-seok of the reactivated 156th Fighter Squadron and flown from KAI’s Sacheon plant to Yecheon, its first operating base. Mass production had started in June 2024. The Air Force plans to declare the type operational in the second half of 2027 and to introduce more than 100 aircraft by the early 2030s. KAI has said the first 40 are air-to-air jets for delivery by 2028, with 80 more, carrying long-range air-to-ground missiles, by 2032.

KAI’s brochure prints three dimensions: length 16.9 m (55.4 ft), span 11.2 m (36.7 ft), height 4.7 m (15.6 ft). The Herald’s 22 Sep 2026 account repeats the length and span and adds a maximum speed of Mach 1.8 (about 2,200 km/h), a maximum takeoff weight of 25.6 metric tons, and a maximum payload of 7.7 tons. Treat those performance lines as the Herald’s published description of the aircraft, not as a flight-test card released with the 22 Sep delivery.

KAAN

TUSAŞ says the development contract with SSB was signed on 5 Aug 2016 and that the signed contract covered the preliminary design phase: design the aircraft, build engineering and test infrastructure, and learn how to certify a combat aircraft. Anadolu reported the rollout in March 2023 and the name KAAN, given by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in May 2023.

The first flight was on 21 Feb 2024 at Mürted airfield in Ankara, flown by test pilot Barbaros Demirbaş. Anadolu quoted then-TAI head Temel Kotil: 13 minutes, 230 knots, 8,000 feet. TUSAŞ’s product page repeats those figures and adds a second flight on 6 May 2024: 14 minutes, 10,000 feet, 230 knots. SSB’s same-day note marked the first flight as a milestone and did not add performance numbers.

That is the entire published flight log this article can tie to TUSAŞ. 230 knots is not Mach 1.8. TUSAŞ’s specification table does list a maximum speed of 1.8 Mach at 40,000 ft, a service ceiling of 55,000 ft, and load limits of +9 / −3.5 g, plus length 20.3 m, span 13.4 m, height 5 m, wing area 71.6 m², maximum takeoff weight 34,750 kg, and thrust 2 × 13,150 kgf (2 × 29,000 lb). Those are manufacturer-published design figures. The two 2024 sorties did not demonstrate them.

Later airframes are a different story, and the labels shifted through 2026:

31 Jul 2026: AeroTime reported that TUSAŞ released video of a P1 prototype’s first low-speed taxi at Ankara, and that this was not the 2024 jet (which that article calls P0). P1 and P2 had been shown in Ankara on 13 Feb 2026.
Farnborough, 20–24 Jul 2026: AeroTime reported CEO Mehmet Demiroğlu saying P1 could fly within a couple of months and that both new jets could fly together by the end of 2026. Breaking Defense, reporting the same show on 22 Jul, quoted him expecting two KAANs side by side by the end of next year — meaning 2027 if “next year” is read from that article’s date. Those two accounts of one airshow do not match. Both are kept.
2 Oct 2026: Demiroğlu told Anadolu at TEKNOFEST in Şanlıurfa that P1 system checks and, in his words as translated by Anadolu, slow-taxi work were far enough along that P1 could fly within weeks, and P2 immediately after, if there are no setbacks, before year-end. A line in that same interview about more than 600 flight hours and a third prototype that flew “last month” is attached, in Anadolu’s wording, to the Hürjet trainer discussion, not to KAAN. It is not counted as KAAN hours here.

So on 4 Oct 2026 the confirmed KAAN flight record is still the two 2024 sorties, plus ground tests of newer prototypes. A P1 first flight “within weeks” was a company target, not an event.

Engines: F414 now, F110 now, national engines later

KF-21 — GE F414, license-built

On 25 Jun 2024 KAI signed a 1.96 trillion won (Yonhap: about US$1.41 billion) DAPA contract for the first 20 production KF-21s, including manuals and training. The same day Hanwha Aerospace signed a 556.2 billion won contract to supply engines from that month through December 2027. Yonhap said Hanwha will deliver around 40 F414 engines plus spare modules. BusinessKorea, reporting Hanwha’s announcement, said the engines will be built at Changwon Plant 1 under a license from GE Aerospace, and put the contract at about US$401 million (556 billion won). Yonhap’s won figure is the one used here; the dollar conversions move with the rate the wire chose that day.

Hanwha’s announcement, as carried by BusinessKorea, also said the company wants engines “developed with Korea’s own technology,” without a flight date or a thrust figure for that future engine. A specific indigenous-engine timetable for a KF-21 Block III is not used here, because the pages that mention one were not available in full.

KAAN — GE F110 now, TF35000 hoped for later

Reuters, reporting the Indonesian contract, said Turkey’s defence ministry described KAAN as powered by two General Electric F110 engines, the same family used on F-16s. That matches the 29,000 lb class on the TUSAŞ spec sheet. It does not match a fully indigenous engine.

On 22 Jul 2026 Demiroğlu told reporters at Farnborough, according to Breaking Defense: 10 F110s already in hand for prototypes; 80 more being bought for serial production; the export license “went through the Congress on July 9.” He said serial production was at least two and a half years away, so timing should not hold up Turkish Air Force deliveries, which he still put on schedule by 2028. A company official told the same outlet the first of those 80 engines was expected in 2027. GE’s statement to Breaking Defense welcomed the work and did not add quantities.

The notification itself: AeroTime reported on 26 Jun 2026 that the Trump administration formally notified Congress on 24 Jun 2026 of a sale of dozens of F110s valued at more than $700 million, “according to a State Department notification seen by Reuters.” This article could not open that Reuters story (the page returned an access error), so the $700 million and the 24 Jun date are cited via AeroTime’s account of Reuters, not from the Reuters text. Breaking Defense adds that Rep. Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had criticized the administration for a thin briefing, and ties congressional resistance to Turkey’s 2019 purchase of Russian S-400 systems, which got Ankara removed from the F-35 program. That is the export-politics fact. It is not a description of how an S-400 is used.

The national engine is still a plan. At the May 2026 SAHA exhibition, Breaking Defense reported that TEI was showing a TF35000 concept, that company officials said it was still in the design phase, that prototype production was expected to start in 2027, and that Turkish Aerospace hopes to use it on KAAN by 2032. A July Breaking Defense piece still projected 2032 and described the TF35000 as “still in production,” which is looser than the May “design phase” line. The May SAHA reporting is the more specific of the two.

Indonesia is the link — and the dispute

The KF-21 share

Yonhap’s first-flight story said the first phase cost 8.1 trillion won, with Indonesia as a partner for 20 percent, and a second phase of 700 billion won through 2028 for armament tests. The same story also called the overall project 8.8 trillion won. Those two Yonhap figures, in one article, are not identical. Later stories do not clean it up: the 13 Jun 2025 Yonhap piece calls the project 8.1 trillion won and the original Indonesian share 1.7 trillion won; the Herald on 30 Jun 2026 says Indonesia originally agreed to about 20 percent, amounting to 1.6 trillion won, and joined in 2016.

What the 2025 renegotiation does lock, in DAPA’s telling to Yonhap, is the new ceiling: 600 billion won (Yonhap: about US$443 million), roughly one-third of the old pledge. The agreement was signed at an arms exhibition in Jakarta on Wednesday 11 Jun 2025. Jakarta had paid about 400 billion won by then. In May 2024 it had proposed both the lower cash figure and less technology transfer. Seoul approved the cut in August 2024. The text sat unsigned through a police investigation into alleged technology theft by Indonesian engineers at KAI. Yonhap’s 2 Feb 2024 report said engineers were suspected of storing KF-21 development data on a USB, that the National Intelligence Service and the Defense Counterintelligence Command were examining whether the data included strategic technology, and that the question was not yet answered. The June 2025 signing, a DAPA official told Yonhap, “appears to indicate the two sides have moved past the issue.” That is a political statement, not a published court result. This article does not treat the theft allegation as proven.

DAPA also told Yonhap that the technology and other conditions bought by the reduced payment would be negotiated after development ended, and would not exceed the 600 billion won value.

On 30 Jun 2026 the Herald, citing DAPA, said Indonesia finished paying the 600 billion won on 25 Jun 2026. About 536 billion was in by April; Jakarta had pledged the remaining 64 billion by the end of June. Officials said the money covers one prototype, Indonesian personnel costs, and technology-transfer-related expenses. The airframe identified for Indonesia is the fifth prototype, which first flew in May 2023. The Herald said Seoul was now expected to review that transfer. It had not reported the aircraft as delivered. A DAPA official said transfers would be kept to “appropriate value,” with national interest and technology protection in view, and declined to comment on any Indonesian plan to buy more KF-21s. The Herald noted a separate 16-jet export idea only as “reportedly under discussion.” That is not a contract.

Co-production, then a Turkish order

The original bargain, as Defense News summarized it on 6 Jul 2026, included technology so that PT Dirgantara Indonesia could build 48 KF-21 Block I jets in Bandung. Defense Logistics Agency head Yusuf Jauhan told reporters in late June that domestic production will not materialize. Defense News wrote the reduced contribution as “600 million won.” DAPA’s figure, via Yonhap and the Herald, is 600 billion won. The Defense News won figure is not used. The Jauhan quotation is: it is a named Indonesian official, on the record to that paper, saying local manufacture is off.

The same story said officials were more interested in ready-made jets, that PTDI told Defense News internal talks were still open and no definitive plan existed, and that “official sources” thought the better odds sat with suppliers offering more technology transfer. Ju Hyung Kim of the Security Management Institute told the paper the choice looked “largely practical and financial,” and that dropping co-production could make a plain KF-21 sale easier for Seoul to manage. That is an analyst’s view, not DAPA policy.

Separately, Indonesia signed for KAAN. The Indonesian Ministry of Defense said Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin witnessed an implementation contract for 48 KAAN aircraft on 26 Jul 2025 at IDEF in Istanbul, following a government-to-government agreement of 11 Jun 2025. The ministry said the contract includes joint technology development and a local industrial base. It did not publish a price or a delivery year. Reuters, the same week, quoted ministry spokesperson Frega Wenas Inkriwang and underlined that gap: no contract value, no delivery dates. Reuters also noted Jakarta’s 42 Rafales, ordered in 2022 for $8.1 billion, plus talks on China’s J-10 and the US F-15EX. Defense News in July 2026 added that Jakarta was weighing 24 more Rafales, and that an April overseas loan scheme for 48 KAANs was worth $10 billion with deliveries from 2032. Those dollar and calendar figures are not in the July 2025 ministry statement or in the Reuters account of it. They are one newspaper’s later report, and they sit beside Breaking Defense’s May 2026 line that Indonesia had contracted “last June,” which does not match the ministry’s 26 Jul 2025 date. The ministry date is the one treated as the contract date.

Turkey’s own order

On 6 May 2026 SSB and TUSAŞ signed a procurement contract at SAHA in Istanbul. Anadolu named the signatories — Haluk Görgün, Ömer Cihad Vardan, and Demiroğlu — and did not print a quantity. Demiroğlu told Breaking Defense two days later: “The initial sale was made for the first batch of 20 Block 10 aircraft. This is the first order. Over time, we expect the numbers to increase.” AeroTime later wrote that deliveries under that contract were scheduled from 2028 through 2030. Anadolu’s contract story does not contain that window. The 2028 date that Demiroğlu himself restated at Farnborough, to Breaking Defense, is a first-delivery target for the Turkish Air Force, not a published last-aircraft date.

Export politics, without a scoreboard

Question	KF-21, as sourced	KAAN, as sourced
Who has ordered it, in writing	South Korea: first 20 in the June 2024 DAPA–KAI contract; Air Force goal more than 100 by the early 2030s (Herald, 22 Sep 2026). Indonesia: one prototype inside the 600 billion won package, transfer still described as under review on 30 Jun 2026. No signed multi-jet Indonesian buy was in these sources.	Turkey: 20 Block 10, per the CEO to Breaking Defense after the 6 May 2026 signing. Indonesia: 48, implementation contract 26 Jul 2025, price unpublished.
Engine license	F414, Hanwha, GE license, ~40 engines for the first batch through Dec 2027.	F110. Ten on hand; 80 for series production after a July 2026 congressional clock. National TF35000 still pre-production.
What “local production” means for Indonesia	Jauhan: the Bandung co-production plan will not happen. Scaled technology transfer still to be negotiated, capped at the value of 600 billion won.	The Indonesian ministry says the contract builds local industrial capacity and technology sharing. It does not say Indonesia will assemble a flying KAAN on a stated date.
US politics	2015 refusal of four mission-system technologies pushed those items onto Korean firms. The engine stayed American.	F110 sales are entangled with the S-400 / F-35 break. The June 2026 notification moved anyway.

Breaking Defense also said in May 2026 that Turkish Aerospace was courting Saudi Arabia, with no contract attached. AeroTime reported that Demiroğlu told the Spanish outlet Infodefensa in May 2026 that preliminary government-to-government contacts with Spain were “in the initial stages,” and that Spain had made no public statement. Neither is an order. Spain is, separately, a Hürjet customer in Demiroğlu’s October Anadolu interview (deliveries aimed at late 2028). That trainer deal is not a KAAN deal.

Dated timeline

When	What a named source said	Source
Apr 2015	United States declines four KF-21 technologies (AESA, IRST, EO pod, RF jammer).	Yonhap, 19 Jul 2022
Dec 2015	DAPA signs the KF-21 development contract with KAI.	Same Yonhap story
5 Aug 2016	SSB and TUSAŞ sign the KAAN development contract, covering preliminary design.	TUSAŞ KAAN page
2016	Indonesia joins the KF-21 as a paying partner. Herald: about 20 percent, later described as 1.6 trillion won.	Korea Herald, 30 Jun 2026
Apr 2021	KAI unveils the first KF-21 prototype.	Korea Herald, 22 Sep 2026
19 Jul 2022	KF-21 first flight, Sacheon, 15:40–16:13. DAPA calls it a 4.5-generation fighter.	Yonhap
Mar 2023 / May 2023	KAAN rolled out; Erdoğan announces the name.	Anadolu, 21 Feb 2024
2 Feb 2024	Indonesian engineers at KAI investigated over KF-21 data allegedly stored on a USB. Not a completed finding.	Yonhap
21 Feb 2024	KAAN first flight: 13 minutes, 8,000 ft, 230 knots.	Anadolu; TUSAŞ; SSB
6 May 2024	KAAN second flight: 14 minutes, 10,000 ft, 230 knots.	TUSAŞ
25 Jun 2024	KAI: 20 jets, 1.96 trillion won. Hanwha: ~40 F414s, 556.2 billion won, through Dec 2027, GE license at Changwon.	Yonhap; BusinessKorea
11 Jun 2025	Indonesia–Turkey government-to-government KAAN agreement. Same week, Seoul and Jakarta sign the KF-21 payment cut.	Indonesian MoD; Yonhap, 13 Jun 2025
26 Jul 2025	Implementation contract for 48 KAAN. No price, no delivery date in the ministry text.	Indonesian MoD; Reuters, 29 Jul 2025
6 May 2026	SSB–TUSAŞ procurement contract. CEO: first batch is 20 Block 10.	Anadolu; Breaking Defense, 8 May 2026
24–26 Jun 2026	AeroTime: US notifies Congress of an F110 sale above $700 million. Herald: Indonesia completes the 600 billion won KF-21 payment on 25 Jun.	AeroTime; Korea Herald
Late Jun / 6 Jul 2026	Jauhan: Indonesia will not build KF-21s at home.	Defense News
9 Jul 2026	Demiroğlu: F110 export license through Congress; 10 engines on hand, 80 for series production.	Breaking Defense, 22 Jul 2026
31 Jul 2026	P1 low-speed taxi video. Not the 2024 airframe.	AeroTime
22 Sep 2026	First production KF-21, No. 001, delivered and flown to Yecheon.	Korea Herald
2 Oct 2026	Demiroğlu: P1 could fly within weeks, P2 after, if nothing slips.	Anadolu

Both sides, and what is at stake

Seoul’s stake is a production line that has already delivered one jet to its own air force, an Indonesian file that shrank from a co-development partner to a single prototype plus a capped technology package, and an export pitch that gets harder if the original foreign partner is also the launch customer for a rival. Kim’s point to Defense News is the optimistic version: a straight sale, without Bandung assembly, is easier. The pessimistic version is also in that story: Indonesian officials told the paper that suppliers with richer technology-transfer offers were ahead. DAPA, on 30 Jun, would not confirm any follow-on KF-21 buy.

Ankara’s stake is a fifth-generation claim resting on two short flights, a US engine license that only cleared Congress in July 2026, and an export contract whose price the buyer’s own ministry did not publish. The 20-jet Turkish order and the “by 2028” line are real statements. They are not a demonstration that P1 has flown, or that TF35000 exists as hardware. Demiroğlu’s October wording — “if there are no setbacks” — is the hedge.

Jakarta’s stake is industrial participation, which it has now been promised, in writing, by Turkey, after a decade of missed KF-21 payments and a data-theft investigation that both capitals say they have politically parked. Whether the KAAN contract’s “local industrial base” becomes a factory or a training clause is not in the July 2025 text. Whether the fifth KF-21 prototype actually moves to Indonesia was still a review, not a delivery, in the last DAPA comments fetched for this piece.

Washington’s stake is the engine. Both jets need a GE turbofan for the aircraft that exist today. Korea’s F414 license is a long-running production arrangement. Turkey’s additional F110s were a 2026 political decision taken while the S-400 argument was still live. A reader who treats either aircraft as independent of US export control is ahead of the documents.

What this piece will not treat as fact

A Korea–Turkey KF-21 technology transfer. Not found in DAPA, KAI, SSB, TUSAŞ, Yonhap, Reuters, Anadolu, or the defense press fetched above.
KAAN’s Mach 1.8, ceiling, or g limits as flight-test results. They are on the TUSAŞ spec table. The published flights were at 230 knots and at or below 10,000 feet.
The $10 billion / 2032 KAAN loan scheme as a term of the July 2025 contract. Defense News reported it in July 2026. The ministry and Reuters did not.
Defense News’ “600 million won.” DAPA’s renegotiated figure is 600 billion won.
A 16-jet KF-21 sale to Indonesia. The Herald called it a report under discussion. DAPA declined to comment.
Saudi or Spanish KAAN orders. Courting and “initial” contacts only.
P1’s first flight. Not reported as of the 2 Oct Anadolu interview.
The USB investigation as a conviction, or any description of how a fighter’s systems are employed, jammed, or targeted. The February 2024 Yonhap item is an open allegation about stored development data. KAI’s page lists weapon-separation dates; those procedures are not repeated here.
An indigenous engine in service on either jet. F414 and F110 are the engines tied to the aircraft now flying or in production. TF35000 is a 2032 hope, still described as design-phase in May 2026.

Sources

Image: KF-21 prototype 006, photographed for the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 21 Dec 2023. The file name on Wikimedia says “First Production”; the ministry caption identifies a prototype, not the September 2026 delivery jet. Korea Open Government License Type 1, via Wikimedia Commons.

#kf-21#boramae#kaan#indonesia#f414#f110#south-korea#turkey

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